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INTERNATIONAL BANKRUPTCY:
IN DEFENSE OF UNIVERSALISM
Andrew T. Guzman*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The globalization of business activity is rightfully celebrated as one
of the triumphs of the second half of the twentieth century. The bene
fits stemming from the globalization of commerce are substantial, but
international transactions also bring with them important challenges
for the world's legal systems. Traditionally, national governments
could focus on their domestic economies without undue attention to
international issues. Today, however, a country's policymakers must
respond to the growth in international business activity with appropri
ate legal changes. Failure to do so will cause their legal regimes to fall
further and further out of step with the needs of the global market
place. The exact content of the changes to be made, however, remains
uncertain. This Article attempts to address one of the many interna
tional business issues that is forcing us to change the way we think
about regulating cross-border activity - the treatment of transna
tional bankruptcy.
It is a fact of economic life that businesses fail. The growth of in
ternational business, therefore, has brought with it a growth in the
number of international business failures.1 In recent years, the in
creased number of international insolvencies has brought attention to
the question of how to deal with transnational bankruptcies.2 That
* Acting Professor, Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California at Berkeley. B.S.
Toronto, 1990; J.D., Ph.D. Harvard, 1996. - Ed. I owe thanks to Lucian Bebchnk, Richard
Brooks, Richard Buxbaum, Stephen Choi, Kevin Davis, Robert Cooter, Jesse Fried, Lynn
LoPucki, Robert Rasmussen, Dhan Shivakumar, Frederick Tung, Elizabeth Warren, John
Yoo, and participants at the Boalt Hall Law and Economics Seminar for helpful comments
and discussions. Special thanks to Jeannie Sears and Nicholas James. Melissa Kennedy and
Ryan Waterman provided invaluable research assistance.

1. Well-known examples of transnational bankruptcies include Maxwell Communica
tions, see In re Maxwell Communication Corp., 170 B.R. 800 {Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994); Bank
of Credit & Commerce International (BCCI), see Hal S. Scott, Supervision of International
Banking Post-BCCI, 8 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 487 (1992); and Olympia and York, see In re
Olympia & York Devs. Ltd. [1993] 12 O.R.3d 500.
2 See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Andrew T. Guzman, An Economic Analysis of Transna
tional Bankruptcies, 42 J.L. & ECON. 775 {1999); Douglas G. Boshkoff, Some Gloomy
Thoughts Concerning Cross-Border Insolvencies, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 931 (1994); Lynn M.
LoPucki, Cooperation in International Bankruptcy: A Post-Universalist Approach, 84
CORNELL L. REV. 696 (1999) [hereinafter LoPucki, Cooperation]; Robert K. Rasmussen, A
New Approach to Transnational Insolvencies, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1 {1997); Jay Lawrence
Westbrook, Choice of Avoidance Law in Global Insolvencies, 17 BROOK. J. lNT'L L. 499
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said, it must be noted that cross-border business failures are new to
neither the business world nor academia. Nor has there been a great
shift in the perspective of legal academics over the years. In an article
published in the Harvard Law Review in 1888, John Lowell wrote: "It
is obvious that . . . it would be better in nine cases out of ten that all
settlements of insolvent debtors with their creditors should be made in
a single proceeding, and generally at a single place."3 One hundred
years later, the call for "universalism" continues: "[A]ll questions of
importance to the distribution of the debtor's assets should be gov
erned by the law of the debtor's principal place of business."4 Legisla
tors5 and judges, however, have resisted these academic proposals out
of concern for the welfare of domestic creditors.6 This Article seeks to
address that concern directly.

(1991) [hereinafter Westbrook, Choice of Law]; Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Theory and
Pragmatism in Global Insolvencies: Choice of Law and Choice of Forum, 65 AM BANKR.
L.J. 457 (1991) [hereinafter Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism].
.

3.
REV.

John Lowell, Conflict of Laws as Applied to Assignments of Creditors, 1
259, 264 (1888).

HARV. L.

4. Donald T. Trautman, Foreign Creditors in American Bankruptcy Proceedings, 29
HARV. INT'L L.J. 49, 58 (1988) [hereinafter Trautman, Foreign Creditors]. Similar state
ments can be found in almost any article on the subject. See, e.g., Todd Kraft & Allison
Aranson, Transnational Bankruptcies: Section 304 and Beyond, 1993 COLUM. Bus. L. REV.
329, 364 ("A system that brings together all the creditors, and all the debtor's property, for a
single distribution is the most efficient and equitable system possible."); Westbrook, Choice
of Law, supra note 2, at 515 ("Universality . . . has long been accepted as the proper goal of
international bankruptcy law by leading writers."); Jay L. Westbrook & Donald T.
Trautman, Conflict of Laws Issues in International Insolvencies, in CURRENT
DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW
655, 667 (Jacob S. Ziegel ed., 1994) ("In general, the goal in developing choice of law rules
should be to apply the home-country law as pervasively as possible."). But see LoPucki, s11pra note 2, passim (arguing against universalism); Stacey A. Morales & Barbara A. Deutcsh,
Bankruptcy Code Section 304 and U.S. Recognition ofForeign Bankruptcies: The Tyranny of
Comity, 39 Bus. LAW. 1573, 1595-96 (1984) (arguing for retention of U.S. jurisdiction over a
foreign debtor's U.S. assets "unless the standards of section 304 clearly mandate that such
control be relinquished through the mechanism of turnover").
5. See REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED
STATES, H.R. D oc. No. 93-137, at 71 (1973); H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 324-25 (1977). The
statute itself expresses concern for local creditors, instructing courts to consider "protection
of claim holders in the United States against prejudice and inconvenience." 11 U.S.C. §
304(c)(2).

6. This characterization is accurate both in the United States and in other countries, but
this Article focuses on the United States because it is the jurisdiction with which I am famil
iar and because "American statutory law goes further than the law of any other industrial
ized nation in authorizing cooperation with foreign insolvency regimes." Douglas G.
Boshkoff, Some Gloomy Thought Concerning Cross-Border Insolvencies, 72 Wash. U. L.Q.
931, 932 (1994). By examining the American situation, we learn a great deal about why
there is not a greater global push for universality. For a discussion of the laws of various
countries, see INTERNATIONAL LOAN WORKOUTS AND BANKRUPTCIES (Richard A. Gitlin
& Rona R. Mears eds., 1989). For a discussion of attempts at multilateral solutions, see
Michael Bogdan, The Nordic Bankruptcy Convention, in CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN
INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW, supra note 4, at 701;
Kraft & Aranson, supra note 4, at 351-61; Donald T. Trautman et al., Four Models for Inter·
national Bankruptcy, 41 AM J. COMP. L. 573 (1993).
.
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In simplified terms, two polar approaches to the adjudication of in
ternational insolvencies exist: universalism and territorialism. In its
purest form, universalism would have all bankruptcy claims adjudi
cated within the debtor's "home country" and would apply the sub
stantive laws of that country. Based on the law of that jurisdiction, the
assets of the firm would be distributed to creditors around the world.7
The alternative to universalism is territorialism or, more pejoratively,
the "grab rule."8 Under this rule, "the courts in each national jurisdic
tion seize the property physically within their control and distribute it
according to local rules."9 Critiques of the territorialist position are
numerous and will not be repeated in detail here.10 For present pur
poses, it is enough to note that proponents of universalism argue that
it would yield a variety of benefits, including a more efficient ex ante
allocation of capital,11 reduced administrative costs due to a reduction
in the number of proceedings,12 avoidance of forum shopping and the
race to file,13 facilitated reorganizations,14 increased liquidation value,15
and the provision of clarity and certainty to all parties.16 The most
7. Several variations on universality have been proposed. A complete description of the
alternatives is beyond the scope of this Article. One possible form of universalism grants
discretion to local courts regarding the turning over of assets to the home jurisdiction. This
approach has been termed "modified universalism." See Westbrook, Choice of Law, supra
note 2, at 517. An alternative approach permits local courts to carry out a "secondary bank
ruptcy proceeding" - distributing assets in order to protect local creditors and then turning
any remaining assets over to the main proceeding. This is the approach advocated by the
UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross Border Insolvency. See UNITED NATIONS, UNCITRAL
MODEL LAW ON CROSS BORDER INSOLVENCY WITH GUIDE TO ENACTMENT (1999); see
also Andre J. Berends, UNICTRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency: A Compre
hensive Overview, 6 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 309 (1998).
8. Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism, supra note 2, at 513. Universalism and territori
alism are, of course, merely the endpoints of a spectrum. Although proposals tend to be
clearly more toward one end or the other, most advocate a position somewhere between the
extremes. Most recently, a variation on territorialism, called "cooperative territoriality" has
been proposed. This regime is sinillar to territorialism, with the added feature that countries
would cooperate to reduce the burden of filing in multiple jurisdictions; share information
regarding distributions; allow the joint sale of assets when necessary to maximize value; fa
cilitate the seizure and return of assets subject to avoidable transfers; and allow the volun
tary investment by representatives in one country in the debtor's reorganization in another.
See LoPucki, supra note 2, at 742.
9. Westbrook,
10. See
Westbrook,

Choice ofLaw, supra note 2, at 513.

generally Bebchuk & Guzman, supra note 2; Rasmussen, supra note 2;
Choice ofLaw, supra note 2; Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism, supra note 2.

11.

See Bebchuk & Guzman, supra note 2 .

12.

See id. at 778.

13.

See Rasmussen, supra note 2, at 6-10.

14.

See Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism, supra note 2, at 465.

15.

See Rasmussen, supra note 2, at 18.

16. See Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism, supra note 2; Jay L. Westbrook, Universal
Participation in Transnational Bankruptcies, in MAKING COMMERCIAL LAW: EsSAYS IN
HONOUR OF ROY GOODE 419, 421 (Ross Cranston ed., 1997) ("Territorialism produces dis
tributions that are a function of local priorities and the presence of a greater abundance of

2180

Michigan Law Review

(Vol.

98:2177

eloquent and effective proponent of universalism in the last decade
has been Jay Westbrook, who has also contributed to this sympo
sium.17 Although Professor Westbrook and I approach the subject of
international bankruptcies from somewhat different perspectives, we
hold very similar views of the preferred policy prescription. With this
in mind, and in the interest of space, I will not address his arguments
directly in this Article. If I did, it would be primarily to express my
support for his views.
Territorialist objections to universalism center on the treatment of
small, local creditors. United States courts often express reluctance to
tum assets over to foreign jurisdictions when doing so would put local
creditors at a disadvantage, ex post, relative to foreign creditors. The
academic criticism of universalism is similarly focused on the treat
ment of local creditors, although the argument is somewhat more sub
tle. The argument against universalism rests on the belief that "uni
versalism would be unpredictable to all but the largest creditors of
multinational companies."18 It is claimed that only they would have
enough at stake to warrant adjustment.19 This Article attempts to
make progress toward resolving the debate between universalists and
territorialists through an analysis of this most central element of the
criticism of universalism. Is there a class of creditors that is better off
under territorialism? If so, how many such creditors are there and
how much do they stand to lose? What conclusions can we reach
about overall social welfare in the face of these concerns?
To understand why the debate needs to focus on what are termed
"nonadjusting creditors," one needs to recognize that in a competitive
market - the most reasonable assumption for capital markets "adjusting creditors" (those who adjust the terms of their lending to
reflect the risks they face) will earn a market rate of return regardless
of the choice of bankruptcy rule.20 If all creditors are adjusting, the
debtor will bear all costs imposed by the choice of law rule because
competitive pressures will prevent the creditors from earning more or
less than the risk-adjusted market rate. In a particular case, of course,
local creditors may be at a disadvantage, from an ex post perspective,

assets in one jurisdiction than in another. . . . The distributions are always unpredictable
and often unfair.").

17. See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, A
L. REV. 2276 (2000).

Global Solution to Multinational Default, 98 MICH.

18. LoPucki, Cooperation, supra note 2, at 712.
19. See id.
20. The terms "adjusting" and "nonadjusting" creditors are borrowed from Lucian A.
Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bank·
ruptcy, 105 YALELJ. 857 (1996) (hereinafter Bebchuk & Fried, Uneasy Case].
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relative to foreign creditors.21 As long as the creditors understand the
bankruptcy rules ex ante, however, they will be able to adjust the out
of-bankruptcy rate of return that they demand.22
From the perspective of the debtor, however, the choice of regime
is important even if all creditors adjust, because a reduction in the
costs imposed by the bankruptcy system will reduce the overall cost of
lending - leading to a reduction in the cost of capital for debtors.
From the debtor's point of view, therefore, bankruptcy policy should
be guided by the overall efficiency of the system. For these purposes,
universalism offers the most appealing regime because it provides
greater certainty with respect to the applicable rules, lower litigation
coi;ts, and a better system for reorganizations than does territorial
ism.23
The current debate, therefore, focuses on three groups - adjusting
creditors, who are indifferent to the choice of regime; debtors, who
prefer universalism because it imposes lower costs; and nonadjusting
creditors, whose role is examined in this Article. Unless nonadjusting
creditors suffer losses under universalism that outweigh the efficiency
benefits of that regime, territorialism must be rejected. To date, there
has been no clear analysis of the impact of universalism on nonad
justing creditors, making it difficult to evaluate the claims in favor of
territorialism. This Article provides the analysis required to evaluate
those claims and, in the end, finds them wanting.
Part II of this Article defines what are termed "nonadjusting credi
tors," and explains why understanding the role of these actors is criti
cal to understanding the debate on transnational bankruptcy. Part III
presents a theoretical analysis and the impact of territorialism and
universalism on nonadjusting creditors. Part IV examines the costs of
each regime, and demonstrates that the costs of territorialism out
weigh the costs of universalism.
II.
A.

NONADJUSTING CREDITORS

Nonadjusting Creditors Defined

The category of "nonadjusting creditors" includes any creditors
that cannot, or will not, adjust the terms of their loans on a case-by
case basis in order to take into account the risks associated with the

21. On the other hand, the opposite will be true in other cases - that is, local creditors
will enjoy an advantage ex post if the bankruptcy is local.
22. In fact, creditors may make adjustments to the rules in ways other than through the
interest rate. They may, for example, alter the maturity of loans, alter the monitoring provi
sions, take more collateral, and so on. In the interests of simplicity and expositional ease,
this Article will speak only of changes in the interest rate.
23. This claim may provoke objections from territorialists. In any case, this Article ad
dresses the efficiency issue in Part III.
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loan, including the risk of nonpayment. Tort creditors, for example,
enter into a creditor relationship with tortfeasors involuntarily and
obviously do not adjust the terms of that relationship to reflect the risk
that the debtor may not pay. The nonadjusting creditor category in
cludes both involuntary creditors, such as taxation authorities and tort
creditors, as well as voluntary creditors, such as trade creditors.24
The general category of nonadjusting creditors can be further di
vided into two subcategories, which I term "weakly nonadjusting" and
"strongly nonadjusting." Both subcategories are nonadjusting in the
sense that they are unable or unwilling to alter the terms of their loan
based on the identity of the borrower. The creditors differ, however,
in the extent to which they adjust credit terms over their entire port
folio of lending.
Nonadjusting creditors are termed weakly nonadjusting when they
account for the risks they face by adjusting the terms of their loans on
an expected value basis calculated over their entire portfolio of loans.
For example, credit card companies are weakly nonadjusting creditors.
A credit card company will charge a single interest rate to all of its
cardholders, without differentiating one cardholder from another
based on the risk of nonpayment.25 The company, however, will set its
overall interest rate such that it earns, in expectation, a competitive
rate of return. The weakly nonadjusting category might also include
retail customers, trade creditors, employees, landlords, educational
lenders, and health care providers.26 Each of these groups provides
credit voluntarily, but typically does not adjust the terms of the credit
on a debtor-by-debtor basis.
Most weakly nonadjusting creditors could, in principle, adjust each
individual loan to take into account the risks presented by a particular
debtor. Nevertheless, a creditor may rationally choose to remain
nonadjusting because, for example, it is too costly to conduct a careful
examination of each transaction and to structure appropriate terms for
a specific loan. To assess the risk presented by a particular debtor, a
creditor must consider the value of that debtor's assets, the amount of
debt carried by the debtor, the relevant provisions of the applicable
bankruptcy regime, and so on. Furthermore, even if the creditor col
lected this information, there would remain the cost of negotiating ap-

24. Although some voluntary creditors (including trade creditors) may be labeled
nonadjusting, it should be kept in mind that they are likely to be at least partially adjusting.
Such creditors may, for example, refuse to lend to debtors that are considered too much of a
credit risk.
25. More sophisticated approaches exist, of course. The credit card company may de
cide to charge a different rate to different categories of cardholders, for example. Never
theless, such creditors do not tailor the terms of their lending on a debtor-by-debtor basis.

26. See, e.g., John Hudson, The Case Against Secured Lending, 15 INT'L REV. L. &
ECON. 47, 56 (1995); Mark J. Roe, Commentary on "On the Nature of Bankruptcy: Bank
ruptcy, Priority, and Economics," 15 VA. L. REV. 219, 225 (1989).
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propriate terms for a loan in light of the particularities of the debtor.
In cases where these costs are relatively high and the amount of credit
sought is relatively small, the creditor may find it more efficient to ap
ply a single rate of interest to all its debtors. Again, credit card lend
ing fits this description - it is simply too costly for a credit card com
pany to assess the credit risk presented by each card holder, so the
credit card company simply charges the same rate to each of them.27
In contrast to weakly nonadjusting creditors, strongly nonadjusting
creditors extend credit on terms that fail to adjust even for the overall
lending portfolio of the creditor. Tort creditors represent one exam
ple of this kind of lending. Tort creditors become creditors as a result
of injury or accident without negotiation and without control of the
terms of their lending. Tax obligations represent another possible ex
ample of a strongly nonadjusting creditor.28
This Article uses the terms adjusting and nonadjusting rather than
the more commonly used terms "voluntary" and "involuntary" credi
tors29 because the voluntariness of a transaction does not bear directly
on the efficiency of the terms of the loan. The analysis in this Article
turns on whether a creditor adjusts the terms of the loan for each
debtor, not the willingness of the creditor to extend credit. Credit card
companies, for example, are voluntary lenders, but do not adjust the
terms of their lending on a transaction-by-transaction basis.
B.

Why Consider Nonadjusting Creditors?

Nonadjusting creditors are important to the debate on transna
tional bankruptcy for two reasons. First, as discussed in Section III.A,
nonadjusting creditors will behave inefficiently under a regime of uni
versalism, potentially weakening the case for such a regime. Where
creditors are fully adjusting, they select the lending terms of each
transaction to yield a competitive return to the lender ex ante. Where
creditors are nonadjusting, however, they do not tailor terms to the
27. See Bebchuk & Fried, Uneasy Case, supra note 20, at 885; Lucian A. Bebchuk &
Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy: Further
Thoughts and a Reply to Critics, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1279, 1300 (1997) [hereinafter
Bebchuk & Fried, Further Thoughts] ("[T]rade creditors generally charge uniform rates to
all customers that are allowed to purchase on credit. ").
28. The categorization of creditors as strongly nonadjusting rather than weakly nonad
justing is sometimes debatable. Tax and other government obligations, for example, may be
considered weakly nonadjusting because the government is, at least in principle, able to ad
just the terms of the loan and may be considered to do so over certain portfolios of lending.
Tort creditors might also be more accurately considered to be weakly nonadjusting if courts
permit the collection of an interest rate that resembles the risk-adjusted market rate. This
article assumes that the tax authority and tort creditors are strongly nonadjusting. If it is as
sumed instead that they are weakly nonadjusting, the arguments advanced in this Article are
stronger.
29. See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor's Bargain, 80 VA. L. REV. 1887,
passim (1994) [hereinafter LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor's Bargain].
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specific transaction. This leads to inaccurate borrowing decisions on
the part of the debtor and, effectively, a subsidy paid from low-risk
debtors to high-risk debtors. As a result, high-risk debtors will borrow
too much (and, therefore, overinvest in their activity), and low-risk
debtors will borrow too little (and underinvest in their activity). As
shown in Section III.A, universalism may increase the variation in risk
faced by lenders and, therefore, may increase the magnitude of this
distortion.
Second, and perhaps more important, considering nonadjusting
creditors serves an important pragmatic objective. Despite the near
unanimous support of the academic community, policymakers have
chosen not to adopt universalism. Although a number of other argu
ments have been advanced for territorialism,30 its support leans heavily
on a sense among judges, legislators, and some academics that territo
rialism can help small, local creditors. As a result, local creditors are
often given protection ex post in the form of a refusal to turn local as
sets over to a foreign jurisdiction. Writing in 1 944, Professor
Nadelmann stated that "in most of the countries, delivery of local as
sets ... is refused at least if opposed by local creditors."31 Those writ
ing on the subject today demonstrate that little has changed.32 Thus,
reluctance to adopt universalist policies is premised on a general view,
one even shared by many supporters of universalism, that local credi
tors suffer losses when a country abandons territoriality. For example,
Professor Westbrook, the most prominent contributor to the literature
on transnational bankruptcies and a strong proponent of universalism,
states:
The central argument for the Rough Wash is that a universalist rule will
roughly even out benefits and losses for local creditors, who will gain
enough from foreign deference to the local forum in one case to balance

any loss from local deference to the forum in another. ...33

And in an accompanying footnote:
The bulk of countries most likely to join in transnational cooperation are

those that believe that they are ... countries [in which the ratio of local

30.

See generally LoPucki, Cooperation, supra note 2.

31.

Kurt H. Nadelmann, International Bankruptcy Law:

Its Present Status,

5

U.

TORONTO L.J. 324, 339 (1944).

32 See Boshkoff, supra note 6, at 938 ("Cooperation is not valued as highly as the pro
tection of American creditors."); see also Daniel M. Glosband & Christopher T. Katucki,
Claims and Priorities in Ancillary Proceedings Under Section 304, 17 BROOK. J. INT'L. L.
477, 477 (1991) ("[C]ourts and commentators have struggled with the tension between pro
tecting local claims in local bankruptcy proceedings and promoting international coopera
tion by ceding control of local assets to a foreign trustee."); Westbrook, Choice of Law, su
pra note 2, at 518 ("International cooperation will be achieved despite local prejudice only if
policy makers are convinced . . . that over a run of cases local prejudice in some cases will be
balanced by local gains in others.").
33. Westbrook,

Theory and Pragmatism, supra note 2, at 465.
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assets to local claims is below the worldwide ratio] at least as often as
they are ... countries [in which ratio of local assets to local claims is

above the worldwide average]. Countries that think they will routinely
be in surplus will not be very eager to join an international scheme; the
benefits to be realized by everyone from greater realization on assets are
probably too imprecise to persuade them that greater asset prices will
outbalance loss of a consistent surplus position.34

United States courts have demonstrated a similar concern for the
ex post treatment of local creditors and, as a result, a resistance to uni
versalism. For example, in In re Toga Manufacturing,35 a Canadian
company embroiled in bankruptcy proceedings in Canada filed a sec
tion 304 petition seeking an injunction against creditor action and
turnover of U.S.-based assets.36 The court denied the petition, stating
that the "[c]ourt must protect United States citizens' claims against
foreign judgments inconsistent with this country's well-defined and ac
cepted policies."37 Similarly, in Interpool Limited v. Certain Freights of
M/V Venture Star,38 the court asked whether "United States creditors
will be similarly protected in both jurisdictions"39 and later in the
opinion stated that "this Court does not intend to stand idly by while
United States citizens and creditors are harmed."40 Rather than ex
amining the debtor-creditor relationship from an ex ante perspective,
these courts looked at the specific questions of law that affect the
American creditor before the court and asked if that creditor would do
as well under the foreign proceeding.41

34. Id. at 465 n.26; see also John D. Honsberger, Conflict of Laws and the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978, 30 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 631, 671-73 (1980) (stating that some may
view a universal rule in the United States as a "giveaway" if American debtors do not re
ceive similar treatment abroad); Gary Perlman, The Turnover ofAssets Under Section 304 of
the Bankruptcy Code, 12 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 521, 531 (1989) (stating that courts that "em
phasize the interests of U.S. creditors" are more likely to refuse turnover); Westbrook &
Trautman, supra note 4, at 657 ("The losses [a universalist country's] creditors would suffer
in some cases would be balanced by gain in others. . . . It might [require reciprocity out of]
fearO that otherwise it would suffer greatly in a world of nations committed to the idea of
territoriality."). But see Kraft & Aranson, supra note 4, at 350 ("[ C]reditors presumably
know of the potential for bankruptcy and its attendant complications when they decide to do
business with foreign companies.").
35.

28 B.R.

165 (Bankr. E. D. Mich. 1983).

36. Section 304 of the Bankruptcy Code permits a U.S. court to order, among other
things, the turnover of a bankruptcy estate's property to a foreign jurisdiction. See 11 U.S. C.
§ 304(c).
37. In re Toga Mfg., 28 B.R. at 170.
38. 102 B.R. 373 ( D.N.J. 1988).
39. Id. at 377.
40. Id. at 380. This Article argues, of course, that such ex post assessments of the wel
fare of local creditors do not lead to an overall increase in the well being of those creditors.
See infra Part IV.
41. Not all American courts have been as resistant to the use of§ 304. There is a set of
cases that grant § 304 petitions fairly liberally. See, e.g., In re Gee, 53 B.R. 891 (Bankr.
S. D.N. Y. 1985); In re Culmer, 25 B.R. 621 (Bankr. S. D.N. Y. 1982).
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Though not always understood by courts or commentators, con
cerns about the plight of local creditors under universalism are simply
misplaced if all creditors can adjust the terms of their loans to reflect
the risks they face.42 Contrary to the approach adopted by the courts
cited above, a sound bankruptcy policy must take into account the fact
that many creditors adjust the terms of their lending to account for
their rights in bankruptcy. Because capital markets are competitive,
adjusting creditors receive a competitive rate of return ex ante. If they
stand to be denied recovery in the event of bankruptcy, they simply
will charge a higher rate outside of bankruptcy. As a result, no sound
reason exists to demand that they receive a particular return in bank
ruptcy. Put differently, attempts to "protect" local creditors by pro
viding them with a higher recovery in bankruptcy simply lead to lower
recoveries by such creditors outside of bankruptcy - the ex ante ex
pected return remains unaffected. Recognizing the importance of
adopting this ex ante perspective rather than the ex post perspective
that dominates the literature is a critical step in understanding the ad
vantages of universalism.43
Once the need for an ex ante perspective is understood, it becomes
clear that concern for the welfare of local creditors matters only as ap
plied to nonadjusting creditors, because adjusting creditors will take
the existing regulations into account.44 The case for territorialism,
therefore, relies heavily on the presence of nonadjusting creditors.
Only if these creditors are somehow better off under territorialism can
that regime be supported. In order to respond to the critics of univer
salism, therefore, we must consider the effect of universalism in the
presence of nonadjusting creditors. If it turns out that concerns about
nonadjusting creditors are misplaced, or if, as this Article argues, the
costs generated by the presence of nonadjusting creditors are smaller
in magnitude than the benefits of universalism, then the case for terri
torialism fails.

42 See Bebchuk & Guzman, supra note 2, at 793-94; Rasmussen, supra note 2, at 35.
43. The importance of adopting an ex ante perspective is well recognized in the litera
ture on domestic bankruptcies. See Barry E. Adler, A Re-examination of Near Bankruptcy
Investment Incentives, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 575 (1995); Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Effects of
Chapter 11 and Debt Renegotiation on Ex Ante Corporate Decisions (HARVARD LAW
SCHOOL PRO GRAM IN LAW AND ECONOMICS DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES, No. 104, 1994);
Robert K. Rasmussen, The Ex Ante Effects ofBankruptcy Reform on Investment Incentives,
72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1159 (1994). In the international bankruptcy literature, however, recogni
tion has taken longer to arrive. See Bebchuk & Guzman, supra note 2; Rasmussen, supra
note 2.
44. From a more systemic perspective, we must also be concerned with the costs of ad
justment by the adjusting creditors. These costs, however, will not affect the welfare of ad
justing creditors because they are simply another factor to take into account when they ad
just their terms. Put differently, the costs of adjustment will be passed on to the debtor. The
impact of adjustment costs on our evaluation of territorialism and universalism is discussed
in more detail below. See infra text accompanying note SS.
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III. ANALYSIS OF NONA DJUSTING CRE DITORS
There is an existing debate about the most efficient way to treat
nonadjusting creditors in the domestic sphere.45 This Article puts that
debate to one side in order to focus on the international issues that
arise in the presence of nonadjusting creditors. Specifically, this Arti
cle seeks to understand how to structure a choice of law rule when
faced with a transnational bankruptcy. Because such a rule inevitably
must select the applicable law from the affected domestic systems, the
specific details of any single system cannot be determinative. Put an
other way, a rule that turns on choosing the regime with the "best"
rules is impractical because there is no agreement on which rules are
best. Thus, regardless of who is correct in the full priority debate in
the domestic sphere, the analysis of this Article offers insight into how
nonadjusting creditors should be treated in transnational cases.

A.

Weakly Nonadjusting Creditors

This Section examines the impact of weakly nonadjusting creditors
on transnational bankruptcy policy from an efficiency perspective. Al
though debtors of a weakly nonadjusting creditor may represent dif
ferent levels of risk, the creditor will charge all such debtors a common
rate of interest.46 This pooling of risk implies that debtors represent
ing a relatively high level of risk for the creditor will be able to borrow
based on terms that are more favorable than would be the case if the
creditor were an adjusting creditor. Low-risk debtors, on the other
hand, will face terms that are less favorable than what an adjusting
creditor would offer. The low-risk debtors, therefore, subsidize the
high-risk debtors, and this subsidy affects borrowing decisions.

Example. Imagine a trade creditor lending to two firms that represent

identical credit risks, except for the fact that they are subject to different
bankruptcy regimes. Suppose that under the regime applicable to Firm

A, trade creditors recover as general unsecured creditors. On this as
sumption, the creditor can expect little or no recovery from Firm A in
the event of bankruptcy.47 Assume that the regime applicable to Firm B

45. The discussion of nonadjusting creditors in the domestic sphere takes place within
the context of the debate regarding the desirability of granting secured debt priority over
unsecured debt. The literature on this topic is voluminous. For a list of sources, see
Bebchuk & Fried, Further Thoughts, supra note 27, at 1281 n.5, 1283 n.11; Bebchuk & Fried,
Uneasy Case, supra note 20, at 862 n.23, 865 n.27.
46. It is more accurate to say that debtors will be charged interest rates that do not fully
reflect the idiosyncratic risk of their loans. It may be that a creditor adjusts the terms of its
loans and manages to capture some of this risk. Such partial adjustment would not change
any of the results.
47. It is well known that general unsecured creditors typically receive very little in bank
ruptcy. See infra note 71.
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gives trade creditors the status of priority claimants in bankruptcy.48 The
creditors' expected recovery, if Firm B were to file for bankruptcy, may
be substantial as a result of the priority status afforded to trade creditors.
From the point of view of the creditor, therefore, Firm A is a relatively
high-risk debtor while Firm B is relatively low-risk.49
Despite these differences, however, both Firm A and Firm B can bor
row on the same terms. This arrangement clearly is inefficient because
the borrowers are not paying the full cost of capital - there will be too
much borrowing (and overinvestment) by the high-risk debtor and too
little borrowing (and underinvestment) by the low-risk debtor. The low
risk debtor (Firm B) will borrow less than it normally would because the
terms of the credit are, in part, a subsidy of the high-risk debtor. The
high-risk debtor (Firm A), on the other hand, will borrow more than it
would if it had to internalize the full cost of its borrowing.

The magnitude of the inefficiency in lending by weakly nonad
justing creditors will depend on the range of risks they face when they
make their loans. As the difference in risk between loans to the high
and low-risk debtors grows, so does the magnitude of the associated
distortion.so For the moment, assume that all non-bankruptcy related
risks are the same for all loans. This allows the analysis to focus on
the bankruptcy issues relevant to the current discussion.st If, under
this assumption, all loans represent roughly the same level of risk in
bankruptcy, the outcome will be close to the efficient outcome - the
rate charged on these loans will be close to the rate that an adjusting
creditor would charge. In the extreme, if all loans receive the same
treatment in bankruptcy,s2 then, all else being equal, a fully adjusting
creditor would charge all debtors the same interest rate - and that
rate would be the same as the one charged by the nonadjusting credi
tor. If, on the other hand, the loans vary wildly in terms of risk, the
nonadjusting creditor will nevertheless charge all debtors the same
rate and, therefore, will lend less efficiently. Symmetrically, for indi
vidual debtors, as the interest rate charged by the nonadjusting credi-

48. Under U.S. law, this means that they would be entitled to priority under section 507
of the Bankruptcy Code.
49. Because the firms are assumed to be identical except for the applicable bankruptcy
law, the designations high- and low-risk refer only to the bankruptcy risk facing the creditor.
50. Formally, as the variance in the distribution of risk faced by the creditor grows, so
does the magnitude of the associated distortion.
51. The impact of territorialism on other risks will be discussed infra where it is shown
that one of the costs of territoriality is that it increases the risks that creditors must take in
making loans. See infra Section III.A.
52. This is the case for purely domestic lending because the same bankruptcy rules apply
regardless of the identity of the debtor. Recall that we have assumed that all debtors are
identical in order to isolate the effect of the bankruptcy rules.
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tor moves further from the interest rate that an adjusting creditor
would charge, the distortionary effect on borrowing decisions grows.53
Notice that, despite the presence of this distortion, weakly nonad
justing creditors are not "cheated" in any way. That is, over their full
portfolio of loans, they receive an expected return that is adjusted for
the overall risk they face.54 Because these creditors receive, on aver
age, a market return, our choice of law objective is simply to enhance
the efficiency of this lending - the benefits from which are enjoyed by
the debtor. From an efficiency perspective, therefore, an optimal
choice of law rule seeks to reduce the variation in risk faced by a given
creditor. Reducing the variance of a creditor's expected return in the
event of bankruptcy reduces the size of the distortion created by the
existence of weakly nonadjusting creditors, and thereby reduces the
subsidy provided by low-risk debtors to high-risk debtors. If we can
ensure that the creditor faces a single bankruptcy regime, and thus a
single set of bankruptcy risks, the amount of lending and borrowing
will be closer to the efficient level than if the applicable bankruptcy
regime varies according to the identity of the debtor.
Under territorialism, a creditor can seek recovery from local assets
under local bankruptcy rules. Assuming that sufficient assets are
available, the creditor need not consider the application of any other
bankruptcy law. In this sense, the lending of that creditor is governed
by a single bankruptcy regime.55 Under universalism, a creditor's re
covery in bankruptcy depends on the substantive rules of bankruptcy
- in particular the priority scheme - of the debtor's jurisdiction.56

53. Notice, however, that the cost of being a low-risk borrower with a nonadjusting
creditor limits the magnitude of the distortion. As the difference in risk presented by the
low-risk debtor as compared to the high-risk debtors grows, the subsidy paid by low-risk
debtors to high-risk debtors grows. This eventually will cause some low-risk debtors to seek
alternative financing rather than pay the implicit subsidy. This will, of course, limit the range
of risks facing the creditor, and thus limit the distortion of lending markets.
54. The fact that these creditors are not cheated allows us to dismiss many of the con
cerns commentators have expressed about the problems creditors will face if they cannot
adjust on a debtor-by-debtor basis. As a result, we can focus more directly on the overall
efficiency of the system. See, e.g., LoPucki, Cooperation, supra note 2, at 712 ("[A] trade
creditor rarely would find it cost-effective to discover the home countries of its corporate
customers, let alone to evaluate the insolvency regimes of those countries and to adjust the
credit terms accordingly."); Westbrook, Choice of Law, supra note 2, at 534 ("There would
be real difficulty applying Hong Kong preference law to a small United States supplier.").
55. In many cases, of course, local assets will not be available and the creditor will have
to file a claim abroad under a foreign law. For the moment, we ignore this possibility in or
der to make the strongest possible statement in favor of territoriality. See infra Section
IV.B.3, where the possibility that more than one bankruptcy law applies to the creditor un
der territoriality is considered.
56. This Article focuses on the priority systems of bankruptcy regimes because the re
covery for nonadjusting creditors, who are typically unsecured, depends primarily on
whether or not they are granted priority status. If they recovery as a general unsecured
creditor (as opposed to a priority claimant) in a liquidation, the expected recovery is almost
zero. See LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor's Bargain, supra note 29, at 1932-33 & nn.172-73
("[S]ecurity tends to expand to the liquidation value of the collateral as a debtor sinks into
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Because a single creditor may lend to debtors from several different
countries,57 the bankruptcy risk faced by the creditor will depend on
the identity of the debtor in a particular case. For a nonadjusting
creditor, therefore, universalism aggravates the distortion discussed
above in a way that territorialism does not. Note how this affects the
lending of nonadjusting creditors. In addition to whatever other fac
tors affect the expected return on a loan (for example, interest rate,
financial status of the debtor, maturity date, and so on), the priority
rules in the various jurisdictions are relevant. A particular loan, there
fore, will represent a higher risk if the main jurisdiction (for bank
ruptcy purposes) provides a low priority for the creditor. It will repre
sent a lower risk if the main jurisdiction grants the creditor a high
priority. In other words, as a result of the differences among bank
ruptcy rules, universalism increases the variance of the risks faced by
the creditor, increases the size of the distortion in lending, and reduces
the efficiency of lending by weakly nonadjusting creditors.

Example. Imagine a nonadjusting creditor with two debtors.58

Both
debtor A and the creditor are from country A and debtor B is from coun
try B.59 The loans are made in country A. Other than their country of
origin, the two debtors are identical. Assume that under the domestic
bankruptcy law of country A, the creditor would not be a priority claim
ant and, therefore, would share pro-rata with other unsecured creditors.
Under the laws of country B, however, the creditor would receive prior
ity and would be paid first, ahead of all other unsecured claimants.
If the creditor were an adjusting creditor, it would take into account
the different bankruptcy rules it faces and would charge rates that ac
count for the treatment it would receive in bankruptcy. For concrete
ness, suppose that an adjusting creditor would charge 12% for a loan to
the debtors if that loan were governed by the laws of country A, but
would demand only 8% if country B's law governed.
Because the creditor being considered is not, on average, "cheated," it
must receive the same average return as an adjusting creditor. In our ex
ample, therefore, the nonadjusting creditor will charge 10%.60 Because
the debtor from country A gets credit at 10% rather than the 12% that
an adjusting creditor would charge, it will borrow more than it would

financial distress."). In fact, it is only when a firm seeks to reorganize that unsecured credi
tors are promised significant payment. See id. at 1932 n.172. Reorganization is facilitated by
universalism rather than territorialism - implying that unsecureds are likely to do better
under universalism.
57. Or, under a menu approach, to debtors who have selected a variety of regimes.
58. The number of debtors could, of course, be increased to any number. I choose two
only for simplicity.
59. For the purposes of this example, a debtor that is "from" a country will have its main
bankruptcy proceedings administered by that country.
60. The 10% figure assumes that the loans are equal in size.
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from an adjusting creditor.61 The benefits enjoyed by this debtor will be
subsidized by the debtor from country B who is charged 10% rather than
8%.62 This debtor will borrow less than it would in an efficient market.63

In this example, we see that the creditor lends inefficiently because
his recovery in bankruptcy depends on the choice of substantive bank
ruptcy law. As an efficiency matter, therefore, this Section has shown
that universalism distorts lending markets in a way that territorialism
does not. Specifically, universalism causes relatively low-risk debtors
to subsidize relatively high-risk debtors. In Section IV.A.1, this Arti
cle considers how large this distortion is likely to be.
B.

Strongly Nonadjusting Creditors

Having discussed the way in which the conventional universalist
approach affects weakly nonadjusting creditors, I now turn to strongly
nonadjusting creditors. By assumption, strongly nonadjusting credi
tors fail to adjust the terms of their lending to reflect the likelihood of
recovery in bankruptcy. They adjust neither on a case-by-case basis,
nor over their entire portfolio of loans. There is no reason to think,
therefore, that changing the treatment given to these creditors in the
event of bankruptcy will affect their behavior. Consider, for example,
a tort creditor. Because she does not negotiate the terms of her exten
sion of credit to the tortfeasor, the tort victim cannot adjust the terms
of her lending. Law, not contract, determines those terms. Tort vic
tims and other strongly nonadjusting creditors, therefore, simply ex
tend credit based on terms that are determined without adjustment for
the return the creditor will receive, either with respect to a particular
loan or over a portfolio of loans. A system designed to give these
creditors the opportunity to recover under local rules would, there-

61. A debtor borrowing up to the point at which the marginal cost of borrowing equals
the marginal benefit of borrowing will obviously borrow more at a rate of 10% than it would
at a rate of12%.
62. In a fully competitive market, this result could not hold in equilibrium. The debtor
being overcharged for credit (debtor B) would simply tum to a different source, making all
creditors fully adjusting. In the context of nonadjusting creditors, however, markets will of
ten be sufficiently illiquid that one debtor can subsidize another. For example, trade credi
tors may not find it worthwhile to adjust their loans on a case-by·case basis. The credit ex
tended by these creditors is associated with the sale of goods or services to the debtor. It
may not be possible for the debtor to acquire the goods or services with more finely tuned
credit terms. In this situation, the debtor simply will have to accept the higher rate, even
though it includes a subsidy to debtor A. But see supra note 24 (discussing how creditors
might achieve partial adjustment in a transnational setting).
63. In a more complete model of the borrowing process, the rate would have to adjust to
account for the fact that one debtor is borrowing more than the other. This effect is ignored
for simplicity. Even if the effect were accounted for, however, it would remain the case that
either one debtor would subsidize the other, or only one of the debtors would borrow from
the creditor.
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fore, yield no efficiency gains. Strongly nonadjusting creditors will
behave in the same fashion regardless of the bankruptcy rule.64
There remain only two possible sources of concern regarding
strongly nonadjusting creditors. First, a form of fairness argument
might arise, premised on the notion that these creditors somehow are
entitled to recover under local law. To the extent that this argument
relies on the frustrated expectations of the strongly nonadjusting
creditors, it lacks force because the creditors at issue have, by defini
tion, not relied on local law. The fact that they do not adjust implies
that their lending behavior is unaffected by the expected rate of return
on their lending. As long as the bankruptcy proceedings of the home
country are fair, and as long as these creditors can pursue their claims
under the laws of the home country, there is no reason not to adopt
universalism with respect to these creditors. Most importantly, the
treatment of strongly nonadjusting creditors should not be allowed to
undermine the increased total recovery and greater fairness generated
by universalism. Second, it may be argued that strongly nonadjusting
creditors will find it difficult to litigate their claim in a distant forum.
To the extent this is true, procedures could be established to appoint a
representative who could file claims on behalf of groups of such credi
tors. 65 For example, a representative could represent all employees in
a case. Such an approach would reduce the costs imposed on these
creditors. Indeed, if we truly want to reduce the costs facing these
64. It might be argued that a tort victim can adjust her level of care in response to the
compensation scheme that is in place. Specifically, the potential tort victim's level of care
will depend on the expected compensation in the event of an accident. Because only one
level of care can be selected, it will not be appropriate with respect to all tortfeasors. To the
extent that there is divergence between the chosen level of care and the level of care that
would be chosen based on an individual potential tortfeasor, an inefficiency is generated. By
providing local bankruptcy priority, the argument goes, we reduce the variance in expected
returns for this creditor in much the same way that we reduce the variance in returns to
weakly adjusting creditors. The magnitudes at issue here, however, are almost certainly very
small. It is unlikely that a potential tort victim would change her behavior significantly
based on the choice of law rules for transnational bankruptcy. First, because she is only
probabilistically a tort victim, the rules' impact on her will be only a fraction of their impact
on other creditors. Second, because she does not know the identity of a possible future tort·
feasor, her conduct will be based on a weighted average of her expected returns under the
various possible regimes. If one is injured in the United States, the tortfeasor will very likely
be American - implying that the dominant factor in the potential victim's calculation will
be American law. Other legal systems will have an impact, but only a small one. Further
more, the truly important variable for determining the standard of care is the size of the
damage award. When the tort occurs in the United States, the damage award will be deter
mined by applying the substantive law of the United States. Only then will the relevant
bankruptcy regime determine priority. A much larger source of variance than the choice of
bankruptcy law will be the specifics of the tort - making the choice of bankruptcy law a
concern of lower order.

65. The European Union Convention on Bankruptcy, for example, permits the liquida
tor in an insolvency proceeding in one EU country to file claims on behalf of all creditors in
that proceeding in other EU proceedings involving the same debtor. See Jay Lawrence
Westbrook, Universal Priorities, 33 TEX. INT'L LJ. 27, 30 (1998) [hereinafter Westbrook,
Universal Properties].
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creditors, we could achieve this result without altering the priority
scheme of the main jurisdiction by having the costs of nonadjusting
creditors (whether individually or collectively) paid by their own gov
ernments or out of the estate.

IV. COMPARING UNIVERSALISM AND TERRITORIALISM
This Part demonstrates that, although the theory presented in Part
III shows that the costs of universalism are higher in the presence of
nonadjusting creditors, these costs are probably quite small. As a re
sult, the costs of eliminating the distortion caused by nonadjusting
creditors almost certainly exceed the benefits of doing so. After con
sidering the magnitude of the identified distortion, this Part examines
the costs of correcting the problem. Ultimately, the conclusions of this
Part provide further evidence in support of universalism. Indeed, they
demonstrate that even deviations from universalism advocated by
commentators who favor that approach impose costs that outweigh
their benefits.66
A.
1.

The Costs of Universalism

The Magnitude ofthe Distortion

To appreciate the amounts at stake, consider first the impact of the
distortion on the lending terms of weakly nonadjusting creditors, as
suming that the amount recovered in the event of the debtor's failure
depends on the choice of bankruptcy law. When setting the terms for
its portfolio of loans, one would expect a weakly nonadjusting creditor
to consider a host of factors that have nothing to do with the relevant
bankruptcy regime. These would include the characteristics of the
pool of debtors; alternative uses for the funds; the out-of-bankruptcy
collection system available to the creditor; the likelihood of bank
ruptcy; the number and priority of other creditors; the total amount of
outstanding debt; the likelihood that the debtors will acquire future
debt; the likelihood that legal claims are currently pending or will arise
in the future;67 and the ability to enforce a judgment against a foreign
debtor.

66. For example, Trautman et al. suggest that they are prepared to accept some devia
tion from universalism: "If cases should arise where the reasonable expectations of unso
phisticated creditors (in the United States, 'the little old lady in tennis shoes') might suffer
unfairly, there is no reason a special rule cannot be applied in such cases." See Trautman et
al., supra note 6, at 624. In fact, this Section argues that there are good reasons to avoid such
special rules.
67. In In re Johns Mansville Corp., 36 B.R. 727 (Banlcr. S.D.N.Y. 1984), the debtor,
Johns Mansville was forced to file for banlcruptcy because it was unable to obtain credit 
the potential lenders were concerned that the future tort claims against Johns Mansville
would be so large that their loans would not be repaid. See Alan N. Resnick, Bankmptcy as
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The above factors will be the most important in setting the terms
of a nonadjusting creditor's lending because they directly affect the
creditor's return. In contrast, the choice of bankruptcy regime has a
much more indirect effect on the creditor's return. A change in the
choice of law regime only affects a particular loan if (i) the debtor is
foreign; (ii) the bankruptcy laws of the countries involved differ with
respect to the particular creditor; and (iii) the value of assets is such
that the difference in the laws translates into a difference in return.
Because the bankruptcy rules impact the creditor's return indirectly,
we would expect a change in the choice of bankruptcy regime to have
only a marginal effect on the terms offered by the creditor negotiating
in the shadow of the law.68 The choice of territorialism as compared to
universalism, therefore, will have only a small effect on the expected
return of the creditor. This implies that factors unrelated to the bank
ruptcy choice of law will be the primary determinants of the variance
in returns faced by a particular creditor. Whatever inefficiency this
variance creates, therefore, will not be sensitive to changes in the
choice of law system.

2.

The Amount at Stake

Consider the dollar amounts at stake. Compared to the total
amounts involved in a bankruptcy, these are likely to be quite small.
Nonadjusting creditors may hold a significant share of the claims
against the bankruptcy estate, but a change in choice of law rules will
affect only a small share of those claims. Thus, for our purposes, we
need focus only on loans that nonadjusting creditors hold and that will
receive different treatment under the two systems (universalism versus
territorialism).
We are, therefore, not concerned with loans held by secured credi
tors or other adjusting creditors. Similarly, the distortion discussed
here will not affect loans held by nonadjusting creditors who are not
priority claimants.69 Such creditors will collect on the same basis pro rata with other creditors - regardless of the choice of law rule.
Furthermore, these creditors typically receive no recovery in bank
ruptcy, making the choice of law rule irrelevant.7° Finally, some prior-

a Vehicle for Resolving Enterprise-Threatening Mass Tort Liability, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 2045,
2046 (2000).
68. That is, one would expect the terms to be relatively inelastic with respect to the
choice of law rule.
69. That is, those who do not have a priority under the bankruptcy laws of the home
country or under local law.
70. See Domenic E. Herbert & Michael J. Pacitti, Down and Out in Richmond, Virginia:
The Distribution of Assets in Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Proceedings Closed in 1984-1987, 22
RICHMOND L. REV. 303, 315-16 (1988).
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ity creditors will receive priority under either choice of law rule.
These creditors face similar prospects for recovery under either rule.71
Ultimately, the only group of nonadjusting creditors whose ex
pected return is significantly affected by the choice of law rule consists
of those creditors that will receive priority under one choice of law
rule and not under another. When a firm whose home country is
abroad ends up in bankruptcy, local nonadjusting creditors will prefer
territorialism if local law gives them priority, while foreign law does
not. On the other hand, they will prefer universalism when local law
does not provide a priority but foreign law does.
3.

Employees and Trade Creditors

The above discussion demonstrates that the group of weakly
nonadjusting creditors who are likely to benefit from territorialism
represents a small percentage of all creditors. Should the efficiency of
the bankruptcy process be compromised for the majority of creditors
in order to assist this minority? Proponents of territorialism advocate
precisely this trade-off. Rather than consider the impact of territori
alism on all creditors, however, attention is often drawn to a small
number of creditors that seem to elicit sympathy from commentators.
In order to address the arguments of territorialists as directly as possi
ble, therefore, this Article now turns to consider those same creditors.
It is important to keep in mind, however, that they represent only a
small fraction of the total value at stake in a bankruptcy, and that
adopting territorialism to assist these creditors will impose a cost on
the entire system - ultimately leading to a higher cost of lending.
The weakly nonadjusting creditors that seem to attract the atten
tion of courts and commentators critical of universalism are employees
and trade creditors. These creditors, however, present a concern only
to the extent that they face different outcomes under universalism
than under territoriality.72 Although one can imagine cases in which
the choice of law regime may matter for these claimants, it often will
not. Admittedly, differences exist in the way bankruptcy regimes treat
claims of employees, and, to a lesser degree, trade creditors. It is im-

71. Strictly speaking, the likelihood of recovery for such creditors under territorialism
will be a function of local assets and other local priority obligation whereas under univer
salism it will be determined by worldwide assets and other priority obligation throughout the
world. This might lead to different outcomes under the different regimes. Recovery may
also depend on the ordering among priority claimants, in which case the choice of law may
have some effect.
72. For example, under Mexican law, employees receive super-priority (including prior
ity over secured creditors) for unpaid wages earned within one year of the filing for bank
ruptcy. See Rasmussen, supra note 2, at 14 n.59 (citing "Ley de Quiebras y de Suspension de
Pagos," D.0., 1993 art. 261). Under American law, employees do not receive super-priority
and their recovery as priority claimants is limited to $4,000, which must have been earned
within 90 days of the bankruptcy filing. See 11 U.S. C.§ 507(3).
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portant, however, not to exaggerate these differences.73 A complete
comparison of the many national priority schemes lies outside the
scope of this Article, but a cursory look at a few helps to understand
the differences and similarities among them.
First, national systems rarely provide priority status to unsecured
trade creditors. None of the countries surveyed for this Article pro
vides such a priority,74 with the exception of France (which provides
priority to only a limited number of trade creditors75) and Mexico.76
For a trade creditor, therefore, the filing of bankruptcy by the firm
probably signals the end of its ability to collect regardless of the appli
cable choice of law regime.77 In other words, arguments that univer
salism is unduly harsh on trade creditors,78 or that trade creditors are
subject to the distortion explained in this Article, miss the mark. In
the vast majority of cases, the choice of law rule in bankruptcy will
have no impact on trade creditors because they do not recover any
thing in either case.
The treatment of employees presents a more complex problem. A
basic similarity exists among the various systems, in that every country
surveyed provides at least some priority status for the claims of em
ployees.79 Within the category of priority claimants, however, the

73. "[T]he great majority of systems give high priority to the claims of employees and of
public entities, especially revenue authorities." Westbrook, Choice of Law, supra note 2, at
511. "These national (priority] systems differ, although they also have some important
commonalities. For example, our country is alone, as far as I know, in granting special pro
tection to consumers who have made deposits with retail stores and landlords. On the other
hand, we have in common with many other countries priority systems favoring employees,
the domestic fisc, and secured creditors." Westbrook, Universal Priorities, supra note 65, at
30.
74. The following countries' bankruptcy regimes were considered: United States,
Canada, Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, France, Germany, Israel, Japan, Netherlands,
Switzerland, and England.
75. See 1 INTERNATIONAL LOAN WORKOUTS AND BANKRUPTCIES, supra note 6, at
353.
76. See AM. LAW INST., TRANSNATIONAL INSOLVENCY PROJECT, INTERNATIONAL
STATEMENT OF MEXICAN BANKRUPTCY LAW 69-71 (Tent. Draft Apr. 15, 1998).
77. This assumes that the firm is to be liquidated. If the firm is to be reorganized, there
is little doubt that the more efficient regime is universalism. See infra text accompanying
note 98.
78. This argument is difficult to support on its own terms because trade creditors are
almost certainly weakly nonadjusting and, therefore, will receive a market rate of return
over their portfolio of lending. Given this fact, it is difficult to know what it means for the
system to be "unduly harsh." Nevertheless, this claim is addressed because the fairness of
universalism is an oft-cited concern.
79. See INTERNATIONAL LOAN WORKOUTS AND BANKRUPTCIES, supra note 6, at 1 3137 {Argentina), 1 71-72 (Brazil), 269-70 (Egypt), 302-53 (France), 377-78 (Germany), 423-24
(Israel), 499-500 (Japan), 566 (Netherlands), 592-93 (Switzerland); J.H. DALHUISEN,
DALHUISEN ON INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY AND BANKRUPTCY § 1.06(1) {1986) (Eng
land); AMERICAN LAW INST., TRANSNATIONAL INSOLVENCY PROJECT, INTERNATIONAL
STATEMENT OF CANADIAN BANKRUPTCY LAW (Tent. Draft, Apr. 1 5, 1997) (Canada); 11
u.s.c. § 507 (1994) (United States); INTERNATIONAL STATEMENT OF MEXICAN
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status of employees' claims, and the amount of those claims, vary from
country to country. For example, in the United States, employees'
claims rank behind only secured claims, administrative expenses, and
claims allowed under section 502(f) of the Bankruptcy Code.80 The
amount of employees' claims that are subject to this priority, however,
is limited to $4,000 for each individual or corporation for wages and
salaries. There is also a provision for employee benefit plans, but it is
limited to "the number of employees covered by each such plan multi
plied by $4,000," minus the amounts paid to the covered employees
under the wage priority.81 In contrast, Mexican employees receive a
"super-priority" - recovering ahead of most secured creditors as well
as other unsecured creditors. Furthermore, it does not appear that
their potential recovery is capped.82
The above juxtaposition of the United States and Mexico, how
ever, is somewhat misleading. Most major countries have comparable,
though not identical, provisions for the priority status of employees.
Under the laws of the United States, Canada, Germany, Israel,
Australia, Switzerland, England, and Egypt, employees receive
priority behind secured claims and administrative expenses. In Japan,
the Netherlands, and Argentina the same is true, although employees
also recover behind at least one tax authority.83 The priority accorded
employees' claims, therefore, although not completely identical, seems
broadly consistent across regimes. Somewhat more variation appears
in the amount of an employee's claim that is entitled to priority status.

In the United States, as mentioned above, this is limited to $4,000. In
Canada, it is limited to $2,000. Several other countries give no ap
parent cap on the size of such claims, while other regimes, such as
Germany's, limit priority to claims for wages and benefits earned
within a specified period of time.
The importance of differences in the size of an allowable claim,
however, is muted by the nature of employment contracts. Employees
typically receive payment on a regular basis - biweekly or monthly,
for example. It is difficult for a firm
especially a large multinational
firm - to continue to function if it suspends payments to its employ
ees for more than a couple of pay periods. With the possible excep-

BANKRUPTCY LAW, supra note 76 (Mexico); Section 556, Corporations (New South Wales)
Act 1990 {this is a state statute but the laws of other states within Australia are identical); see
also MULTINATIONAL COMMERCIAL INSOLVENCY B-1 (1993).
80. Section 502(f) claims are those that arise in the ordinary course of the debtor's busi
ness after the co=encement of an i nvoluntary bankruptcy proceeding but before the ap
pointment of a trustee or the order of relief. See 11 U.S.C. § 502{f) (1994). The complete list
of priorities under U.S. law is provided in 11 U.S.C. § 507 {1994).
81. 11 U.S.C. § 507{a){4).
82. See AM. LAW INST., supra note 76, at 71.
83. The remaining country surveyed, Brazil, provides a super-priority for employees'
claims that is subordinate to a super-priority for on-the-job-accident claims.
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tion of insiders, employees are unlikely to continue working if they are
not paid. As a result, the employee wage claims that exist in bank
ruptcy will typically represent a small amount of money per employee
and will typically cover a short period of time. The actual difference
between, for example, the open-ended Australian priority (which has
no cap on wage claims) and the restricted American priority for em
ployees, therefore, will be much less in practice than it appears from
the bankruptcy statutes.84
Even if the treatment of employees varies from one jurisdiction to
another, addressing the costs of that variance by adopting territorial
ism simply introduces another cost that will drive up the out-of
bankruptcy costs of the credit extended by labor. Specifically, as
elaborated in Section IV.B.4, territorialism undermines the ability of a
firm to reorganize.85 A bankrupt firm with obligations to its employ
ees often will pay the employees' claims in its proposed plan of reor
ganization. Firms do this to keep the employees they will need for a
successful reorganization and to maintain employee morale. Because
reorganization is much easier under universalism than under territori
alism, employees can, therefore, expect a higher recovery in bank
ruptcy under universalism than under territorialism.86
4.

Creditor Behavior to Reduce the Costs of Universalism

Finally, if universalism imposes a significant cost on transactions,
creditors can adapt their behavior to reduce those costs. It generally
will not be costly for a weakly nonadjusting creditor to acquire enough
information to adjust its loan - at least partially - in order to take
into account the relevant bankruptcy regime. In other words, a
weakly nonadjusting creditor may become an adjusting or partially
adjusting creditor in order to reduce the costs of universalism. For ex
ample, imagine a trade creditor that lends to a variety of automobile
producers. Suppose further that the trade creditor's recovery in bank
ruptcy depends on the applicable law.87 The relevant universe of pos
sible laws might include those of the United States, Japan, and
Germany. Although it may be too costly for the creditor to adjust its
loans for each of the many small transactions the creditor undertakes,

84. This argument, of course, is Jess applicable to differences in the treatment of other
employee claims, such as claims for unpaid benefits.
85. See infra text accompanying notes 96-99 (discussing the importance of reorganiza
tion and the problem it presents for territorialism).
86. In addition, the greater likelihood of reorganization is valuable to employees be
cause it makes it more likely that they will be able to keep their jobs after the bankruptcy allowing them to avoid the dislocation costs associated with searching for new employment.
87. This assumption is probably false, see supra Section IV.A.2, but is made for exposi
tional convenience.
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the cost of making adjustments to account for the country of origin of
the debtor would be small. That is, it would cost the creditor very lit
tle to investigate the bankruptcy laws of each of the three relevant ju
risdictions and modify its lending arrangements based on the home
country of the debtor. Note that the creditor would need to undertake
this inquiry only once, and it could apply the resulting adjustment to
all subsequent transactions. The cost of the inquiry, therefore, can be
amortized over many transactions. Alternatively, individual creditors
could specialize by country and thereby price their loans more accu
rately. These adjustments would not require customizing each trans
action, but rather would simply require a small expansion of the
"menu" of standard transactions to account for the home country of
the debtor. If the low cost of making this adjustment still exceeds the
benefits, this simply implies that the overall costs of universalism are
small.
B.

The Costs of Territorialism

This Section highlights the costs of territorialism that are most im
portant to our discussion of nonadjusting creditors. It does not, by any
means, present a complete discussion of the costs of territorialism, but
it suffices to demonstrate that these costs outweigh those of univer
salism.88
1.

Informational Needs ofAdjusting Creditors

The first point to note is that territoriality dramatically increases
the transaction costs faced by adjusting creditors. Imagine, for exam
ple, a fully adjusting creditor that lends in an unsecured fashion to a
debtor. In order to adjust the terms of its lending, this creditor must
investigate a variety of facts, including the size and priority of other
outstanding debts. Under universalism, the creditor can restrict this
inquiry to the law of one country (the debtor's home country), and
then only needs to identify the current and likely future borrowing of
the debtor and the value of assets likely to be available in bankruptcy
to satisfy creditors.
Under territorialism, the creditor's informational needs, and there
fore its transaction costs, are much greater. The creditor must acquire
all the information it would need under universalism, and, in addition
needs to know the current location of assets, the likelihood that they

88. A more complete list of the costs of territorialism might include the administrative
cost of administering multiple bankruptcies; the cost of multiple bankruptcies on creditors
that must pursue their claims in many jurisdictions at the same time; and the costs of a race
to the courthouse. Once bankruptcy is filed in one jurisdiction, creditors will race to attach
the assets in jurisdictions in which bankruptcy has not yet been filed and that, therefore, are
not subject to an automatic stay.
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will be moved as well as the location to which they might be moved,
the applicable law in every country in which there are assets or into
which assets may be moved in the future, and the creditor's priority
under the bankruptcy laws of each of these jurisdictions. The follow
ing example demonstrates the difficulties facing an adjusting creditor
under territorialism.
Example. Suppose that there are N countries in which assets are cur
rently located and there exists M other creditors. For simplicity, we ig
nore the possibility that the assets may be moved prior to bankruptcy or
that there may be future borrowing - considerations that would further
increase the amount of information required under territorialism. Under
universalism, the creditor only needs to identify two pieces of informa
tion - the value of the assets and its priority under the laws of the home
country. Under territorialism, however the creditor needs to identify the
value of assets in every country, the nationality of all other creditors,89
and its priority in each country - a total of 2N+M pieces of information.
The extent to which turnover of assets is allowed may also depend on
the country to which the assets would be delivered - country A may al
low turnover to country B, but not to country C.90 In this latter case, the
creditor will require information about each country with respect to
every other country, plus information on the nationality of other credi
tors and the value of assets in each country - a total of N2 + N + M
pieces of information.

2.

The Cost ofInformation

Furthermore, the costs of collecting each piece of information is
greater under territorialism than it is under universalism. For exam
ple, under territorialism the applicable laws in country A may depend
on whether or not there has already been a bankruptcy filing in coun
try B, and whether or not a distribution has taken place.91 Similarly,
much of the information required under territorialism, but not under
universalism, is very costly. For example, it is difficult enough to de
termine the total assets of a firm, but it is much harder to identify the
location of all those assets because financial documents may not in
clude locational information. Indeed, in some cases, the information
required under territorialism is not merely harder to accumulate - it
is unavailable. For instance, a creditor can almost never know with

89. The nationality of other creditors is important because territorialism schemes often
favor local creditors over foreign creditors.
90. For example, the United Kingdom provides for some flexibility on the part of courts
when there are certain "established arrangements" in place between the U.K. and the for
eign jurisdiction. No such arrangements exist with the United States. See Ian F. Fletcher,
Commentary on Boshkoff: Some Gloomy Thoughts Concerning Cross-Border Insolvencies,
72 WASH. U. L.Q. 943, 943-44 (1994).
91. For example, under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, payment in a foreign proceeding
must be taken into account in an American distribution. See 11 U.S.C. § 508(a) (1994).

In Defense of Universalism

June 2000]

2201

certainty whether or not collateral will be moved from one jurisdiction
to another in the future,92 particularly with easily moveable collateral,
including financial collateral.93
The most direct consequence associated with the increase in in
formational costs will be an increase in the cost of borrowing faced by
the debtor as creditors pass on their higher costs.
3.

The Number ofNonadjusting Creditors

The increase in costs imposed on creditors (and passed on to debt
ors) will also alter the behavior of creditors, driving some of them to
become weakly nonadjusting. The following example serves to dem
onstrate how this can occur.

Example. Imagine that a creditor wishes to lend to two identical firms

and plans to adjust its loan to account for the risks associated with each.
Suppose that a territorialist regime is in place and that each debtor has a
50% chance of moving its assets to a separate jurisdiction with bank
ruptcy rules that are less favorable to the creditor. At the time of the
loan, the creditor cannot identify whether a debtor will move its assets,
and so the creditor must charge a rate that is a weighted average of the
rate it would charge if it knew the assets would be moved and the rate it
would charge if it knew they would not be moved. In this sense, the
creditor can only adjust partially. Thus, if one of the debtors moves its
assets to the foreign jurisdiction, the debtor that has not moved its assets
(the low-risk debtor) will be subsidizing the borrowing of the debtor who
moved (the high-risk debtor).94 The formerly adjusting creditor, there
fore, would face the same distortion that is faced by nonadjusting credi
tors under universalism.

92. Although creditors can prevent the movement of collateral from one jurisdiction to
another by contract, this solution generates significant costs. First, it limits the flexibility of
investment decisions by reducing the mobility of capital. If the bulk of a firm's valuable as
sets are unable to change jurisdictions, the firm is less able to respond to opportunities, and
may be unable to pursue certain high value projects. This problem is especially severe in the
case of financial assets because the assets are much more valuable to the firm if they can be
used to cover expenses. If those expenses are subject to the approval of the creditor, there
will be severe hold-up problems. See Bebchuk & Guzman, supra note 2, at 800-02 (discuss
ing the inability of private contracting to eliminate the costs of territorialism). The fact that
contractual conditions of this sort exist; see LoPucki, Cooperation, supra note 2, at 758-59,
does not contradict the claim that such provisions carry costs because the existing system is a
territorialist one. The existence of such contracts merely suggests that, where they are pres
ent, they impose a lower cost than the risk that the collateral may be moved. In other words,
it demonstrates the relative size of the two different costs imposed by territorialism but it is
not evidence of the size of either of these costs compared to what would exist under univer
salism.
93. "In some cases the principal assets will be either mobile or outside the boundaries of
any country." LoPucki, Cooperation, supra note 2, at 716 (quoting In re Rimsat, Ltd., 98
F.3d 956, 961-62 (7th Cir. 1996).
94. See supra note 92.
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Thus, although territorialism reduces the magnitude of the distor
tion discussed in Part III, it also increases the number of creditors that
face a distortion of this type. A priori, the net effect is ambiguous,
meaning that universalism may be preferred over territorialism even if
we look only at the efficiency of lending decisions by nonadjusting
creditors and ignore the various other costs of territorialism.95 This is
so because if enough creditors are driven to become weakly nonad
justing creditors, this cost alone could exceed that imposed by the dis
tortion caused by universalism discussed in this Article. Ultimately,
this results in inefficient lending by the creditor and a direct harm to
low-risk debtors, who subsidize high-risk ones.
Because the informational demands of territorialism increase the
uncertainty facing nonadjusting creditors, the magnitude of the distor
tion described in Part III increases. Universalism increases the distor
tion because creditors may find it difficult to predict the content of the
bankruptcy rules that will apply to the transaction. Territorialism in
creases the distortion because creditors will find it difficult to predict
the value of local assets that will be available in bankruptcy, the na
tional law that will govern their claim, the nationality of other credi
tors, and so on. Although the relative size of the distortion created by
territorialism as compared to universalism is an empirical matter,
there is no a priori reason to imagine that the distortionary effects of
universalism exceed those of territorialism. Thus, even looking only at
the impact on weakly nonadjusting creditors - the one context in
which universalism appears to impose costs - it is entirely possible
that territorialism imposes even greater costs.
4.

Territorialism Frustrates Reorganizations

Because the territorialist argument is strongest in the context of
liquidations, this Article has focused primarily on that form of bank
ruptcy proceeding. We also must take into account, however, the ef
fect of territorialism on the ability of a bankrupt firm to reorganize.
Many bankruptcies - especially large bankruptcies - involve reor
ganizations. Table I reports the percentage of firms that filed under
chapter 7 and chapter 1 1, categorized by the size of the firm.96

95. The debtor's ability to move assets also creates strong incentives for strategic be
havior by debtors and creditors. This problem will be especially severe in the case of finan
cial assets. A debtor on the verge of bankruptcy, and receiving pressure from creditor A
could, for example, threaten to move its financial assets to another jurisdiction - where a
different creditor will be able to collect them - if creditor A does not assist the debtor
through additional lending, restructuring of the debt, delays in foreclosure, etc.
96. The percentages do not add up to 100% in some rows because chapter 13 cases are
not included.
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TABLE l97

Under $100,000

$100K-$500K
$500K-$1M
$1M-$5M
$5M+

Chapter 7

Chapter 11

53
27
17
5
3

14
30
71
94
97

As Table I shows, large firms enter into chapter 1 1 reorganizations
much more often than chapter 7 liquidations. Because cross-border
firms are likely to be large, we can infer that the firms affected by the
choice of universalism or territorialism will typically be seeking to re
organize rather than liquidate. This has profound implications for the
debate on international bankruptcy because it means that we should
be focusing more attention on reorganizations. Once the attention
turns to reorganizations, the case for universalism becomes even
stronger.
Under universalism, the law of a single country governs the deci
sion of whether or not to reorganize. The location of the assets affects
the reorganization decision only to the extent that their location af
fects the debtor's business.98 Under territorialism, reorganization also
depends on the decisions of all other relevant jurisdictions. For exam
ple, reorganization may be impossible if important assets are located
in a jurisdiction that: i) does not favor reorganizations; ii) believes re
organization is inappropriate in this case; or iii) feels its local creditors
can be satisfied out of local assets. Thus, reorganization depends on
the agreement and cooperation of every jurisdiction in possession of
firm assets. If, for example, courts in every country adopt a test that
permits reorganization only when local creditors fare better under
such a scheme ex post,99 then any given court system will cooperate
only if the return to its local creditors under a reorganization exceeds
the return to those creditors under a liquidation.
In the end, it is clear that a value-maximizing decision on reorgani
zation requires a centralized procedure. Universalism offers a much
better framework for reorganizations because it puts all assets of the
firm under the control of a single court. Allowing each jurisdiction to

97. Data are taken from Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Financial Char
acteristics of Businesses in Bankruptcy, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 499, 524 tbl.2A (1999).
98. For example, a production facility in a country that is in the midst of severe political
turmoil is worth considerably less than one in a country that is at peace.
99. This approach is suggested by 11 U.S.C. § 304, and is essentially the inquiry under
taken by the courts in In re Toga and Interpool Ltd. v. Certain Freights of the MN Venture
Star, 102 B.R. 373 (D.N.J. 1988), see supra text accompanying notes 35-41.
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arrive at its own conclusion is akin to giving each creditor - or at least
the creditors of each country - a veto over reorganizations. It is cer
tain to lead to the liquidation of enterprises that would be more valu
able as going concerns. Any serious consideration of territorialism,
therefore, must account for the tremendous difficulty associated with
reorganizing a firm under that regime. The inability of a territorialist
regime to deal effectively with reorganization ultimately presents one
of the largest problems with that approach.
C.

Critiques of Universalism

In a recent article, Professor LoPucki argues in favor of a form of
territoriality that he calls "cooperative territoriality."1 00 His article,
along with his contribution to this symposium, represent by far the
most significant defense of territorialism, and therefore deserves a di
rect response. This Section demonstrates that the arguments ad
vanced by LoPucki, with the exception of arguments that tum on the
presence of nonadjusting creditors and that have already been ad
dressed, do not represent a serious challenge to universalism. To
make this response as clearly and directly as possible, this Section will
address each of Professor LoPucki's arguments in the order he ad
vances them in his 1999 article.

1.

Foreign Law and Courts Governing Domestic Relationships

The first of LoPucki's concerns is that a domestic debtor-creditor
relationship would be subject to the bankruptcy rules of a foreign ju
risdiction.1 01 "[I]n a universalist system, the priority of Mexican work
ers against a U.S. firm operating in Mexico would be determined by
U.S. rules of priority - much to the disappointment of the Mexican
workers affected.m02
There appear to be three components to this point. First, there is a
concern that nonadjusting creditors will fail to take into account the
applicable bankruptcy rules under universalism. This Article has, of
course, responded to this concern at length above and, in particular,
shown that the recovery of employees is not very sensitive to the
3
choice of regime.10
The second concern is that, even if adjustment were possible, "it
would create a stiflingly complex domestic interface for the interna
tional bankruptcy system. Presumably, sellers would adjust the prices

100. LoPucki, Cooperation, supra note 2, at passim.
101. See id. at 709-13.
102 Id. at 711.
103. See supra Section IV.A.3.
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of all goods and services sold on credit in the domestic economy to re
flect the bankruptcy priority of the seller under the law of the debtor's
home country."104 We would expect this, of course, if all creditors
were adjusting. Furthermore, this yields the efficient outcome. If all
creditors adjust, they will structure their out-of-bankruptcy contracts
to ensure that they receive a market rate of return in expectation. In
other words, creditors will price their credit appropriately - causing
credit to flow to its most productive uses, and ensuring that projects
with a positive expected value will be carried out while those with a
negative expected value will not. Rather than a cause for concern, this
is a goal to strive for.
Finally, LoPucki seems uncomfortable with the notion that the
country in which assets are located cannot adjudicate the distribution
of those assets in accordance with its own values and concerns. This
loss of sovereignty implies that the country in which the assets are lo
cated must allow its values to be trumped by the values of the main ju
risdiction. LoPucki's argument, however, overlooks the fact that any
solution to the choice of law problem posed by a transnational bank
ruptcy will involve the loss of sovereignty of one country - this is an
unavoidable consequence of international business activity. Under
universalism, as LoPucki points out, the country in which the assets
are located must yield to the main jurisdiction (where these are not
the same country). He claims that, as a result, creditors in the host
country will suffer prejudice.105
The story, of course, could be told from the opposite perspective.
Imagine, for example, a bankruptcy in which assets are located in
Mexico (and perhaps elsewhere), creditors are located in both the
United States and Mexico, and the home jurisdiction under univer
salism would be the United States.106 That the home jurisdiction is the
United States suggests that the firm has closer ties to the United States
than to Mexico.107 To the extent the bankruptcy rules differ between
the United States and Mexico, a choice of one regime over the other
will offer an ex post benefit to some creditors while harming others.
Choosing Mexican law for the adjudication of the assets requires the
subordination of United States law and policy to those of Mexico. De
spite the fact that the debtor is more closely associated with the
United States than with Mexico (as evidenced by the fact that the
United States is the home jurisdiction) and the fact that at least some
of the creditors are in the United States, American values are subor-

104. LoPucki, Cooperation, supra note 2, at 711.
105. See id.
106. This is the example used by LoPucki, who concludes that turning the assets over to
U.S. jurisdiction is undesirable because Mexico loses its ability to implement its system of
bankruptcy values. See id. at 710-12.
107. See infra note 108 (discussing the determination of the home jurisdiction).
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dinated.108 This leaves the United States unable to implement its own
value system just as much as choosing United States bankruptcy law
would frustrate Mexican goals (and perhaps more because of the
debtor's close association with the United States). The important
point is that the distribution of assets (ignoring transaction costs,
which, as this Article has argued, are lower under universalism) is a
zero-sum process. The choice-of-law problem is, as a result, also zero
sum - where the values of two countries conflict, one must be chosen
at the expense of the other. The value of assets whose distribution is
affected by the choice of law regime represents the loss of sovereignty
of one country in favor of that of another. This fact is an unavoidable
part of the choice of law decision. Put simply, international business
activity requires the compromise of certain notions of national sover
eignty because many countries may have an interest in the fate of
debtors and their creditors.
2.

Indeterminacy of the "Home Country" Standard

For universalism to work, of course, one must identify the "home
country" of the debtor. In the purest form of universalism, the gov
erning law is that of the "main" jurisdiction, defined as the home
country of the debtor.109 Possible approaches for defining the main ju
risdiction include the place of incorporation, the principal place of
business,110 and the "center of main interests."111 The factors that
should drive the choice are the ease with which the home country can
be identified and the ease with which the debtor can choose or select
the applicable law. The parties to a transaction must know which is
the main jurisdiction in order to adjust the terms of the loan appropri
ately, but if it is too easy for the debtor to change the main jurisdic
tion, it could choose in such a way as to disadvantage strongly nonad-

108. It might be argued that the plausible candidates for determining the home jurisdic
tion will sometimes choose a jurisdiction that is, at least arguably, not the one with the great
est connection to the debtor. Even if that is true, it is clear that in the vast majority of cases,
the home jurisdiction will be a good proxy for the country most interested in the debtor.
109. Under a contracting reginte, like the one suggested by Rasmussen, the relevant ju
risdiction would be whatever was chosen by the debtor ex ante. See Rasmussen, supra note
2.
110. See Trautman et al., supra note 6, at 580; Trautman, Foreign Creditors, supra note
4, at 55 (arguing for the principal place of business test).
111. This is how the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency identifies the
home country. See UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON CROSS BORDER INSOLVENCY WITH
GUIDE TO ENACTMENT, supra note 7, at Art. II(b); Manfred Baiz, The European Union
Convention on Insolvency Proceedings, 70 AM. BANKR. LJ. 485, 504 {1996) (stating that EU
Convention takes the center of main interests to be "the principal place of business
[which] until proof to the contrary [is presumed to be] the place of the registered office");
Berends, supra note 7, at 329-30; European Union Convention on Insolvency Proceedings,
Nov. 23, 1995, art. 3, para. 1, 35 l.L.M. 1223.
.

•
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justing creditors that are likely to interact with the firm. This, in turn,
would generate an incentive for countries to provide regimes that
grant nonadjusting creditors a low priority. For this reason, a test
based on the place of incorporation would be inappropriate.112 A test
such as the principal place of business, on the other hand, is much
more difficult for the debtor to manipulate.113 Determining the main
jurisdiction using, for example, the principal-place-of-business test or
the center-of-main-interests test, typically will be easier than attempt
ing to identify the location of all the debtor's assets - including finan
cial assets and future assets - which may be spread among many ju
risdictions and which may be moved at any time. Also note that under
territorialism a debtor may have an incentive to mislead a creditor re
garding the location of assets in order to make the creditor believe it
faces a favorable bankruptcy regime. The creditor, therefore, must
independently verify the location of all assets.
Professor LoPucki claims that the lack of agreement over the stan
dard to use in identifying the home country represents a serious prob
lem for advocates of universalism, stating that "the home countries of
a substantial number of companies remain in doubt."114 To the extent
that he refers to the fact that no single test has emerged as the pre
ferred test, his critique relates to the implementation of universalism,
and not to its merit. There is no doubt that a universalist system
should choose a single test to determine the home jurisdiction, but this
does not constitute a reason to prefer territorialism.
If Professor LoPucki refers instead to the fact that, under any test,
close cases will arise in which the home country is difficult to identify,
his claim that there are many such cases conflicts with the views of
most commentators. In fact, there is widespread agreement among
those interested in transnational insolvency that, in the vast majority
of cases, the home country will be easy to identify - making the issue
a minor question.115 In those few cases where ambiguity exists, credi
tors must take that uncertainty into account when they negotiate the

112. One could give the debtor the ability to select the main jurisdiction at the time of
incorporation as long as nonadjusting creditors are protected. This would require some form
of cooperation among countries to fix the priority status of these creditors. This point has
been made in both the domestic and international debates. See Barry Adler, Financial and
Political Theories ofAmerican Corporate Bankruptcy, 45 STAN. L. REV. 311, 339-40 (1993);
Rasmussen, supra note 2, at 21-22; Alan Schwarz, Contracting About Bankruptcy, 13 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 127 (1997).
113. Note that whichever test is used, it would be best for a single criteria to serve as the
determining factor (e.g., the principal place of business) in order to promote clarity and pre
dictability.
114. LoPucki, Cooperation, supra note 2, at 713.
115. See Rasmussen, supra note 2, at 12 ("In most situations, it will be clear which coun
try is the home of the debtor."); Westbrook, Choice ofLaw, supra note 2, at 529 ("Although
circumstances will exist in which determination of the home country of a corporation will be
difficult, it will usually be self-evident.").
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loan. Although this will introduce inefficiency in some cases, creditors
rarely will need to consider more than two jurisdictions. Contrast this
outcome with territorialism, under which creditors must consider the
laws of all jurisdictions in which assets are located, or into which assets
may move.

It does not suffice, of course, merely to point out that occasional
problems will arise with identifying the home country. Although no
one could seriously claim that the choice of law problem in transna
tional bankruptcies - regardless of the rule adopted - will be simple
in every case, the proper question is not whether the home country
standard is fully predictable in one hundred percent of the cases, both
real and imagined, but rather, whether it provides greater total bene
fits than the possible alternatives. This, of course, brings us back to a
comparison of the relative merits of territorialism and universalism.
On the issue of predictability, it seems that universalism presents the
better choice. While occasional cases may occur in which the identity
of the home country remains in doubt, a territorial approach based on
the future location of assets - including mobile assets, financial as
sets, and assets not yet acquired - clearly does not present a more
predictable choice of law rule. Basing jurisdiction on the home coun
try of the debtor, regardless of which definition of home country is
used,116 leads to greater certainty than does a territorial approach.
Professor LoPucki does not deny that the removal of assets on the
eve of bankruptcy is a serious problem for territorialism. He argues,
however, that the problem can be solved within a territorialist frame
work. Under his system, assets would be "located" in a country if that
country were able to exercise power over them.117 The idea is that
only a small number of countries will have this ability over any given
asset at any given time. As a result, he argues, this system provides a
reasonably clear rule.
This approach is difficult to square with Professor LoPucki's gen
eral argument that a universalist system leaves the identity of the
home country indeterminate. In order to lend efficiently, a creditor
needs to know, at the time of contracting, which legal regime's rules
will control the distribution of assets in a bankruptcy. Professor
LoPucki's proposed rule would lead to much greater uncertainty re
garding the applicable law than would a universalist regime. First,
Professor LoPucki concedes that more than one country may have the

116. See supra text accompanying note 110.
117. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Case for Cooperative Territoriality in International
Bankruptcy, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2216, 2219-20 (2000).
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ability to control an asset at the time of bankruptcy, making the appli
cable bankruptcy rule uncertain.U8
Second, recognizing that the problem of strategic removal of assets
is a serious one under territorialism,119 he proposes the establishment
of treaties to ensure that such assets are returned to the country in
which they were located during the pre-bankruptcy period. Professor
LoPucki does not provide further details regarding the treaties he has
in mind. Instead, he argues that the problem of strategic removal is
small because creditors can contract to prevent such removal, and lo
cal law can criminalize extreme versions.120 It is true that contractual
solutions to the problem of removal are possible, but they come at sig
nificant cost. Notice that the problem here is much greater than the
strategic removal of assets on the eve of bankruptcy. It includes the
movement of assets at any time after the creditor lends to the debtor.
Such movement undermines the efficiency of the lending process. The
sort of restrictions on the movement of capital that Professor LoPucki
cites as a solution to the problem of capital movement, therefore,
would restrict such movement for the entire life of the loan. If credi
tors impose restrictions on the movement of assets, they limit the abil
ity of the firm to pursue opportunities abroad. This represents both a
private and social cost that is avoided through universalism.121 Estab
lishing a system that encourages such contractual conditions on all
large-debt contracts represents a significant constraint on international
capital mobility.122
Although the above arguments support universalism, they also
provide support for the contract-based approach advocated by Profes
sor Rasmussen.123 Under his proposed regime, a debtor would choose
its "home" country at the time of incorporation. Because this choice
takes place before the corporation has any creditors, all creditors can
adjust the terms of their lending to take the chosen regime into ac
count.124 The key difference between the contracting approach and
universalism is that the former gives debtors the ability to make a one-

118. See LoPucki, Cooperation, supra note 2, at 743 ("Often more than one country will
have (de facto power over assets], necessitating further agreement to fix a single location.").
Professor LoPucki does not specify the sort of further agreement that he has in mind.
119. See id. at 758 ("The problem of strategic removal of assets on the eve of bankruptcy
would be more severe under territorialism than universalism.").
120. See id.
121. A more detailed discussion of the problem with private solutions to territorialism
can be found in Bebchuk & Guzman, supra note 2, at 800-02.
122. See supra note 92.
123. See Rasmussen, supra note 2; Robert K. Rasmussen, Resolving Transnational In
solvencies Through Private Ordering, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2252 [hereinafter Rasmussen, Pri
vate Ordering].
124. See Rasmussen, supra note 2, at 5.
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time choice of the applicable law at the time of incorporation. The
addition of such choice should lead to an increase in efficiency and
welfare, as Professor Rasmussen argues, making the choice-based ap
proach an attractive option.
As a theoretical matter, there is little to criticize about the contract
model. The most serious problem with a contracting model is the po
tential incentive it may provide to lawmakers to establish "debtor ha
vens." Rasmussen recognizes this problem and argues convincingly
that the magnitudes involved are likely to be small. 125 In his view,
debtor havens remain an issue only for tort creditors, and for this
group he proposes that "any bankruptcy regime selected by a firm ac
cord at least nominal priority to tort victims similar to what they
achieve in their home country. "126 In my view, Rasmussen's approach
to the debtor haven question resolves any concern that a choice-based
system would cause strategic behavior by national governments trying
to take advantage of nonadjusting creditors. If additional creditors are
deemed strongly nonadjusting, they should receive the same treatment
as tort creditors.
The primary difficulty with a contract-based system is not that it
somehow represents bad policy, but rather that it is incomplete. In the
absence of a mechanism for changes in the chosen bankruptcy regime,
the contracting regime will typically lead to outcomes identical to a
universalist regime, because firms typically will choose the applicable
regime long before they engage in transnational activities. At the time
of incorporation, a firm cannot be expected to anticipate its future
structure and future bankruptcy needs. Indeed, even a cursory exami
nation of available bankruptcy regimes may represent a cost that out
weighs the benefits for a new corporation, because that firm's business
activities normally will be domestic in nature when it begins opera
tions, making a choice of the local regime likely. Thus, where a firm
exercises choice at the time of incorporation, one normally would ex
pect it to choose the local regime - making the system identical to
universalism.
Under a contract-based regime, of course, lawmakers would need
to adopt default rules for those cases in which no regime was explicitly
chosen. The search for a default rule leads us back to the question of
whether territorialism or universalism is preferable. For all the rea
sons advanced by supporters of universalism, that system would repre
sent the better default rule.
An additional problem may arise in the implementation of a
choice-based international regime alongside a mandatory domestic re-

125. Rasmussen's arguments are, in many ways, similar to those advanced in this Arti
cle. See Rasmussen, Private Ordering, supra note 123, at 2264-74 (discussing debtor havens).
126. Id. at 2271.
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gime. A firm that starts its business without any international connec
tions would be subject to the domestic regime, regardless of its at
tempts to choose another regime at the time of incorporation. When
the firm becomes a "transnational firm" (however defined), it would
then receive the benefit of its choice of regime. Such a change in ap
plicable bankruptcy regime, of course, would impact existing creditors
in a way that introduces distortions in the firm's investment deci
sions.127 In fairness to Rasmussen, he also has advocated a choice
based approach to domestic bankruptcy, and if choice were adopted in
both the domestic and international context, the treatment of domes
tic and international firms would become consistent. Rasmussen's
proposal, therefore, requires much more sweeping changes to the
bankruptcy laws. Universalism, on the other hand, does not require
any adjustments to the domestic system.
3.

The Extent ofJurisdiction of Corporate Groups

LoPucki accurately points out that large firms often operate as a
group of separately incorporated firms rather than as a single transna
tional entity. Should such a group be handled as a single enterprise in
bankruptcy, or should it be treated as a series of independent firms
(perhaps each with its own bankruptcy filing)?
The presence of corporate groups clearly complicates the adjudica
tion of a transnational insolvency. This is true under either territori
alism or universalism. Under universalism, the danger is that creditors
must take into account the manner in which the home country of a
parent corporation will treat the group. If the subsidiary will be con
sidered part of the group and, therefore, brought into a bankruptcy in
the parent's home country, the bankruptcy law of that country will
have to be taken into account. On the other hand, if the subsidiary
will be treated as an independent entity, the bankruptcy law of the
home country of the subsidiary is the relevant one. Needless to say,
this complicates the analysis facing an adjusting creditor, and increases
the distortion caused by weakly nonadjusting creditors.128
Once again, however, the relevant question is not whether univer
salism makes transnational bankruptcies work as well as domestic
bankruptcies, but rather, whether it offers a better solution than terri
torialism. Territorialism provides creditors with predictability inas
much as creditors can be sure that local law will govern the distribu-

127. See Bebchuk & Guzman, supra note 2.
128. Another consequence of the presence of corporate groups may also be to increase
the number of weakly nonadjusting creditors. If the manner in which the home country of
the parent will decide whether or not to exercise jurisdiction over the subsidiary is unknown
or unpredictable, creditors who would normally be adjusting creditors may be forced to be
have like weakly nonadjusting creditors with respect to the subsidiary.
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tion of local assets. What territorialism cannot provide, however, is
any certainty regarding the share of the group's assets that will be
within the jurisdiction at the time of filing, or a workable mechanism
for reorganizations.
Note first that the existence of corporate groups is a manageable
problem for adjusting creditors. Secured creditors, for example, often
solve the problem by taking a security interest not only in the assets of
the debtor, but also in the assets of related corporations - either par
ents or subsidiaries. The bankruptcy of the debtor triggers a default
on the loan and permits collection efforts against other members of
the corporate family. As a result, secured creditors can effectively
bring the assets of the entire corporate family within their reach. Un
der a universalist regime, the creditor can then recover in bankruptcy
from the family members that are included in the estate and out of
bankruptcy from those family members that are outside the estate.
Largely the same result will come about under a territorialist regime,
except that the creditor must pursue recovery in separate bankruptcy
proceedings in each country in which assets are located - increasing
collection costs. Furthermore, under territorialism, the decision of
which members of the family will be put into bankruptcy will be made
independently by national courts. This encourages a race to the
courthouse in cases where some members of the corporate family are
not yet in bankruptcy, and a duplication of litigation, across jurisdic
tions, regarding whether or not to put a member of the family into
bankruptcy.
Second, as a corporate group approaches bankruptcy, there may
be significant transfers of value from one member of the corporate
group to another. This may be done, for example, in an attempt to
stave off bankruptcy through restructuring or to pay off important
debtors on whom the debtor needs to rely post-bankruptcy. This sort
of planning prior to bankruptcy renders a territorialist approach highly
unpredictable. A debtor that hopes to reorganize, for example, will
have a strong incentive to place as many assets as possible in a jurisdic
tion that makes reorganization possible. Even if the debtor intends to
liquidate the firm, some jurisdictions may allow equity holders to ex
tract value while others may not - giving the debtor more reason to
locate assets strategically.
The existence of corporate groups also aggravates the problem of
reorganization because effective reorganization may require jurisdic
tion over several separately incorporated members of the group. It is
important to note, however, that this results not from the existence of
a universalist regime, but rather from the existence of corporate
groups. Under a universalist regime, the existence of corporate
groups makes reorganization somewhat more difficult but still possi-
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ble. Under a territorialist regime, however, reorganization is virtually
impossible.129
Although the problem of corporate groups does not justify a move
to territorialism, it does provide a reason to seek cooperation among
national governments in the implementation of a universalist bank
ruptcy regime. For example, if governments could agree on how to
determine the extent of the bankrupt estate, the adjustment of credi
tors would be simplified. A creditor would only need to consider a
single rule in order to understand which parts of the corporate group
would fall within the bankruptcy.

In order to demonstrate that universalism can handle the corpo
rate groups problem as well as territorialism, consider the following
approach.130 Suppose that every separately incorporated entity is
treated as an independent firm with its own bankruptcy proceedings.
Several disadvantages come to mind immediately. First, reorganiza
tion of the entire group will be very difficult. Second, creditors will re
cover based on the assets of a specific member of the group, and the
pre-bankruptcy debtor may have moved assets from one group mem
ber to the other.131 Finally, costs are imposed on creditors that must
file in multiple bankruptcy proceedings, and upon the courts that must
hear the cases. These costs, however, are quite similar to the costs of
territorialism. Indeed, a debtor could structure its dealings in order to
replicate the outcome that would exist under territorialism by incorpo
rating a single, separate entity in each jurisdiction and giving that en
tity ownership of all local assets. The point of this example is not to
advocate a rule that would treat every incorporated entity as a sepa
rate firm for bankruptcy purposes, but rather, to demonstrate that
even such a crude rule will perform as well as territorialism. With
even a minimal level of international cooperation, the problem of cor
porate groups can be resolved more easily under universalism than
under territorialism.
Furthermore, although a full analysis of how to handle the prob
lem of corporate groups lies beyond the scope of this Article, one can
easily imagine strategies superior to the "one incorporation-one bank
ruptcy proceeding" approach mentioned above - implying, of course,
that it is easy to identify approaches that deal with the issue more suc
cessfully than does territorialism. For example, a rule giving the home
country of a parent corporation jurisdiction over its subsidiaries, sub-

129. See supra Section IV.B.4 (discussing reorganization under territoriality).
130. This approach is not presented as an optimal strategy. There is almost certainly a
better way to handle corporate groups. Rather, it is to demonstrate that even with this un
sophisticated and simple strategy it is possible to handle the problem of corporate groups
more successfully than would be done under territoriality.
131. In this situation, of course, the creditor may be able to protect itself through private
contract, but doing so will restrict capital mobility and the flexibility of the debtor.
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ject to a requirement of a certain level of integration, would preserve
many of the benefits of universalism. It would, of course, reduce the
certainty enjoyed by creditors who, in some cases, may be uncertain
about whether a jurisdiction will extend to certain subsidiaries,132 but
this uncertainty will be considerably less than it would be under terri
torialism, where the future location of the assets is entirely unpredict
able.
4.

Strategic Manipulation of the "Home Country" Standard

Finally, LoPucki argues that the "home country" standard pro
vides debtors with the incentive and the ability to engage in forum
shopping.133 Forum shopping in the international context is clearly
undesirable,134 but this point weighs in favor of universalism, not terri
torialism. Once again, the appropriate question is not whether one
could imagine a situation in which universalism fails to achieve the
best imaginable outcome, but rather whether universalism or territori
alism brings us closer to that outcome.
The risk of forum shopping presents a serious problem for territo
rialism because, under that regime, it can be accomplished simply by
moving assets from one jurisdiction to another. In order to deter fo
rum shopping, a universalist regime must avoid identifying the home
jurisdiction based on easily changeable criteria, such as the place of in
corporation. Criteria for identifying the home jurisdiction and that are
costly to change, however, are easy to find.135 A test based on the
main location of firm activity or the location of assets, for example,
would be very costly for the firm to change, and would therefore deter
forum shopping. Where the criteria for identifying the home country
are sufficiently costly to manipulate, no more than a tiny number of
firms would be induced to make such a change in order to capture the
benefits of a particular forum.
V.

CONCLUSION

If the debate regarding the regulation of transnational bankrupt
cies is to move forward, those who support universalism must address,
in very specific terms, the arguments advanced by its opponents. To

132. Though creditors normally will be able to narrow the potential number of applica
ble jurisdictions to a very few.
133. See LoPucki, Cooperation, supra note 2, at 720-21.
134. See id. at 721. The most serious problem with forum shopping would be that it
would systematically disadvantage strongly nonadjusting creditors, including creditors in ex
istence when the debtor enters the forum. See Bebchuk & Guzman, supra note 2, for a dis
cussion of how this can generate costs in the international context.
135. See supra text accompanying note 114.
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date, the most popular and persuasive of those arguments has been an
appeal to the plight of local creditors. If local creditors are adjusting
creditors, however, they simply are not better off under territorialism.
This Article also demonstrates that the efficiency arguments for uni
versalism remain strong even in the presence of nonadjusting credi
tors. Although universalism magnifies the risk-based distortion in
lending by nonadjusting creditors, the magnitude of the impact is al
most certainly small. Furthermore, territorialism has its own way of
aggravating the distortion by increasing the number of nonadjusting
creditors. Thus, even if one looks only at the implications for nonad
justing creditors, territorialism cannot be shown to be a superior ap
proach. If one looks more broadly at the issue of transnational bank
ruptcies, taking into account factors such as the informational
demands of each regime and the impact of each on reorganization, it
becomes clear that the case for territorialism is weak. Finally, it is
worth noting that this Article has understated the benefits of univer
salism and the costs of territorialism. In order to avoid a repetition of
arguments already in the literature, this Article has not discussed fac
tors such as the cost of multiple adjudications under territorialism, the
improved capital allocation under universalism, and the increased liq
uidation value under universalism.136 Those well-established argu
ments, as well as those advanced in this Article, make the case for uni
versalism over territorialism compelling.

136. See supra notes 11-16.

